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ARTICLE TWO WARRANTY DISPUTES IN THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT: ADVANTAGE SELLER OR
DISADVANTAGE COURT?
C. PAUL ROGERS III*
AND LEE ELIZABETH MICHAELS**
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Speidel argues that the Seventh Circuit has failed to
emerge as a major commercial law court in the warranty area because of
incomplete and unsound reasoning that too often favors the seller. As a
result, he concludes, the balance that Article 2 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code strikes between buyer and seller, which often favors the seller
anyway, has shifted, making it very difficult for buyers to prevail on war-
ranty claims.1
One might suspect that the Seventh Circuit's apparent seller bias is
the result of the Chicago School of Economics' influence on the court.
Indeed, there is an argument from that school that efficient product risk
allocation requires that buyers have the burden of producing evidence of
particular purposes or special consequences in establishing a breach.2 A
perusal of the Seventh Circuit opinions, however, belies such suspicions
and reveals a broad cross section of participating judges and panels.3
Beyond questions of economic efficiency, Professor Speidel's conclu-
sions raise interesting issues about how other circuits approach warranty
* Dean and Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law; B.A., J.D.
University of Texas; LL.M. Columbia University.
** Third-year student, Southern Methodist University School of Law; B.A. Vassar College.
The authors would like to thank Roy Ryden Anderson for his helpful comments, not all of
which we adopted. Errors remain ours.
1. Professor Speidel notes that the seller advantage under Article 2 is particularly acute where
the goods are complex or unique and where particular purposes are involved. Speidel, Warranty
Disputes in the Seventh Circuit under Article Two, Saler Advantage Seller?, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
813 (1990) [hereinafter Speidel]. Of course, as Speidel also notes, warranty disputes typically involve
"big ticket" items between commercial entities. Id. at 1-2. Federal courts of appeals will likely hear
only cases involving complex goods or sales of large quantities of goods since the diversity jurisdic-
tion requirement insures that parties to disputes are in different states.
2. See Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insurance, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 241 (1983). See also Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity Requirement:
Once More Into the Void, 67 B.U.L. REV. 9, 48-52 (1987); Note, Imperfect Information, the Pricing
Mechanism and Products Liability, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1057 (1988).
3. Of course, one could argue that this cross-section simply reveals the attractiveness of the
Chicago School approach and that its appeal crosses traditional political lines. The opinions them-
selves do not, however, overtly reveal large doses of economic analysis.
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disputes and whether the Seventh Circuit, certainly one of the most
prominent and important federal circuits, is significantly influencing the
decisions of other circuits in the warranty area. If the Seventh Circuit is
indeed influencing other circuits' warranty decisions, and if Speidel is
correct that the Seventh Circuit's analysis often is shoddy and is skewing
the balance of Article 2, then the warranty case law of the entire federal
judiciary may be out of whack. Thus, this response will take a brief look
at the other circuits for the dual purposes of ascertaining whether similar
trends exist there and attempting to discern the Seventh's influence else-
where in the federal judiciary.
Professor Speidel's critique of the Seventh Circuit's warranty deci-
sions also raises, at least indirectly, broader jurisprudential issues about
the nature of Article 2 and the role of the judiciary in interpreting and
applying the Code. In essence, Speidel accuses the Seventh Circuit of
bad Code methodology. This response will briefly consider that charge
with reference to both the underlying philosophy of the Code and the
practical problems its application presents for courts.
II. CODE APPLICATION
Article 2, as Professor Speidel points out, "is an integral part of a
Code which has a definite order and system"4 and which strikes certain
balances between sellers and buyers with regard to liability and remedy
questions.5 Courts do not perform satisfactorily if they attempt to alter
the balance, are insensitive to relationships between Code sections, or,
worse yet, ignore relevant provisions.
Nonetheless, the Code, while not as unbound as the first amend-
ment's "freedom of speech" protection or the Sherman Act's prohibition
of "restraints of trade," does require considerable judicial construction
and interpretation. For example, in the warranty and remedy sphere, the
courts must contend with phrases like "basis of the bargain" and "failure
of essential purpose." Terms such as these do not come from the com-
mon law and resort to the Official Comments may prove less than helpful
for reasons that are well documented.6
Article 2 was intended as, and indeed does represent, a drastic
4. Speidel, supra note 1, at 815.
5. Id. at 817-21.
6. See, e.g., E.A. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, SELECTIONS FOR CONTRACTS 3-6 (1988). In
their introduction, the compilers note that one of the primary issues concerning the official com-
ments is the extent to which they can be relied upon in interpreting the U.C.C. Because the com-
ments, although written by the drafters, were not enacted by the legislature, the weight which may
be given to the comments remains uncertain. Id.
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change in our commercial law.7 It was designed to insure that the law
conform to prevailing commercial practices and to permit the law to
adapt as those practices and customs changed. The Code champions
uniformity and frequently departs from the common law where commer-
cial practices differ from case law or where the common-law rules im-
pede their exercise. Article 2's heavy emphasis on usage of trade and
course of dealing seeks to assure conformity with commercial practice.
Certainly adaptability, uniformity, and conformity with commercial
practice are highly desirable aspirations for our commercial law. But,
even in the abstract, adaptability comes at some expense to uniformity,
particularly in our dual, decentralized judicial system., The open-ended-
ness of the Code, while laudable and necessary, places considerable pres-
sure on the courts faced with its interpretation. The difficulties are not
unlike those that constitutional (or antitrust) adjudication bring to the
judiciary, even though the Code is a more thorough, systematic statute.
Grant Gilmore described it very well:
The bulk of the Article 2 drafting was done in the early 1940s
along lines laid down in the 1930s. In most states Article 2, along with
the rest of the Code, came into force during the middle and late 1960s.
The courts thus face the problem of dealing with the issues which will
be litigated during the 1970s and 1980s in the light of guide-lines laid
down before World War II. No doubt the detached professorial ob-
server in his study will enjoy the spectacle of things to come in sales
law a good deal more than the harried practitioners and judges on the
firing line.9
The trouble is exacerbated by the fact that Article 2's decampment
from the old Uniform Sales Act and the common law was not entirely
satisfactory. Certainly section 2-207 leads the charge in this regard,
although its perplexities are not truly representative of all of Article 2.10
As another example, no one has quite figured out the reason for section
2-510, which allows a breaching party the benefit of an aggrieved party's
7. Article 2 was not free from controversy. No less an authority than Williston argued that
some of the changes in the law of Sales under the Code "are not only iconoclastic but open to
criticisms that I regard so fundamental as to preclude the desirability of enacting [Article 2] of the
proposed Code." Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV.
L. REV. 561, 561 (1950). Compare Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales: Should it be En-
acted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821 (1950).
8. Of course, as noted above, the adaptability of the Code helps assure that the law continues
to mirror and conform to actual commercial practice.
9. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 101-02 (2d ed. 1975).
10. Professor Speidel refers to Section 2-207 as a "mess." Speidel, supra note 1, at 836 n. 103.
See, e.g., Murray, The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms": Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1307 (1986);
Baird & Weisberg, Rules, Standards and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA.
L. REV. 1217 (1982); Duesenberg, Contract Creation: The Continuing Struggle with Additional and




The conclusion is inescapable that Article 2, in moving the commer-
cial law forward, has placed a heavy burden on the judiciary. For exam-
ple, the courts have had to give meaning to commercial impracticability,
a concept not found in the common law, by looking to "the occurrence of
a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made."' 2 Similarly, Article 2 requires courts to
make determinations about "unconscionable contracts or clauses," a
principle which, according to the Official Comment, is for "the preven-
tion of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of alloca-
tion of risks because of superior bargaining power." 1 3 The application of
that test has caused considerable judicial consternation, particularly
given the confusing illustrations provided by the Comment.' 4
Other examples include, as noted, section 2-719's failure of essential
purpose standard for attacking exclusive or limited remedies.'3 Here, in
support of a provision of great importance and potentially wide applica-
tion, the Comment gives us one sentence, without example.' 6 Section 2-
608 provides that a buyer may revoke his acceptance in instances where
the nonconformity of the goods "substantially impairs its value to him,"
again raising a seemingly subjective standard that the courts must objec-
tively apply.
Courts, faced with such substantial construction and interpretation
issues, could certainly insert a seller (or buyer) bias into their analyses,
whether predicated on principles of economic efficiency or other preexist-
ing concerns. But certainly a seller (or buyer) bias in that context is not
inevitable. For example, in Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. Lorraine
11. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 225-29 (3d ed.
1988).
12. U.C.C. § 2-615; Iowa Elec. Light & Power v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 133-34 (N.D.
Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980);
Tallackson Potato Co. v. MTK Potato Co., 278 N.W.2d 417 (N.D. 1979). See also Hurst, Freedom
of Contract in an Unstable Economy: Judicial Reallocation of Contractual Risks Under UCC Section
2-615, 54 N.C.L. REV. 545 (1976); Comment, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile Economy: Saving
UC.C. Section 2-615frm the Common Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 1032 (1978).
13. U.C.C. § 2-302 and Comment 1.
14. Id. See also Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. Rav. 485 (1967).
15. See generally Anderson, Failure of Essential Purpose and Essential Failure on Purpose: A
Look at Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 Sw. L.J. 759 (1977). See also, R. AN-
DERSON, DAMAGES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ch. 12 (1988).
16. That one sentence simply provides another test for the courts to apply. It states that a
limited remedy clause fails of its essential purpose where it "operates to deprive either party of the
substantial value of the bargain." U.C.C. § 2-719 Comment 1 (1989).
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Corp.,' 7 a case criticized by Speidel,' I the Seventh Circuit arguably was
simply attempting to determine the parameters of the "basis of the bar-
gain" test by examining the comparative knowledge of the parties. That
case involved the question of whether a seller made and breached, over
an eighteen month period, a number of express warranties relating to the
qualities of two copying machines.
By focusing on the actual knowledge of the buyer, the court may
have been better able to ascertain what affirmations of fact formed his
reasonable expectations under the agreement. According to the Royal
Business Machines court, "[a]n affirmation of fact which the buyer from
his experience knows to be untrue cannot form a part of the basis of the
bargain."' 9 Thus, the Seventh Circuit's approach in determining when
an express warranty was made appears to be an attempt to more closely
adhere to the intent of the parties in forming the agreement.
Admittedly, this test seems to provide a more equal burden on the
parties than Comment section 3 which requires that the seller prove that
statements made were not part of the basis of the bargain. But a look at
the comparative knowledge of the parties arguably is a sensible way of
determining what it is that the buyer bargained for. And, although the
buyer did not fare well in Royal Business Machines, presumably in most
cases the weight of knowledge about the goods will rest with the seller
and the buyer will be the beneficiary. 20 If so, the buyer bias of section 2-
313 may not be unreasonably compromised.
Professor Speidel also criticizes the Seventh Circuit for not fully de-
veloping the concept of merchantability under section 2-314.21 Conced-
ing that the Royal Business Machines court probably reached an
acceptable result, Speidel nevertheless argues that "[b]ecause the buyer
claimed substantial losses ... one should expect a more elaborate analy-
sis by the court .... "22 By focusing solely on the lack of evidence avail-
able to prove whether the machines in Royal Business Machines were fit
for their "ordinary" use, the court, in Speidel's opinion, "failed to de-
velop a sufficiently broad conception of merchantability" which would
have "provided enlightenment in future disputes over that implied
17. 633 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1980).
18. See Speidel, supra note 1, at 822-24.
19. 633 F.2d at 44.
20. The Royal Business Machines court was particularly concerned about the 18-month period
over which the warranties were allegedly made. "[A]s to each purchase, [buyer's] expanding knowl-
edge of the capacities of the copying machines would have to be considered in determining whether
Royal's representations were part of the basis of the bargain." Id.
21. Speidel, supra note 1, at 823.




Arguably, Royal Business Machines involved a proof question rather
than improper Code methodology. The Seventh Circuit found that the
buyer had failed to meet its burden of proof in order to prove breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability under section 2-314.24 Because
the Seventh Circuit found that the buyer had failed to establish trade
standards or uses, there was no basis on which to determine whether the
goods in question were "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used" and thus merchantable under section 2-314.25 The court
employed the language of the relevant Code section with its reference to
ordinary purposes, and arguably had no choice but to apply that stan-
dard to the facts presented in order to determine merchantability. The
lack of proof of ordinary purpose left the court with little alternative to
its holding.
In his critique of Royal Business Machines, Speidel seems to be invit-
ing a more expansionary reading of the Code with respect to the defini-
tion of merchantability, encouraging the Seventh Circuit to play a more
activist role. 26 Speidel further contends that the court's discussion in
Royal Business Machines "was limited to a sparse analysis of the essential
statutory provisions and the record." 27 But Professor Speidel's criticism
of "sparse Code methodology," must not be read too broadly. In some
areas Speidel argues that the court should expand the scope of the Code
and fill gaps left by the language of the Code28 and in other areas Speidel
seems critical of the court for expanding doctrine beyond the Code and
creating policy. 29
The Royal Business Machines court was criticized on both accounts.
In attempting to give meaning to the "basis of the bargain" language of
section 2-313, it established an approach which is widely applicable,
although as noted, recasting the seller's burden somewhat as set forth in
the Comments. Facing a similar task with respect to section 2-314's
"merchantability" concept, the court took a narrower approach, focusing
on the buyer's burden of proof. As such, the court does little to reduce
"the risk to a buyer purchasing complex goods that have no 'ordinary
purposes' in the trade to meet particular purposes that are not clearly
23. Id. at 823-24.
24. Royal Business Machines, 633 F.2d at 46.
25. U.C.C. § 2-314(3) (1989).
26. It is unclear why the fact that the buyer is claiming substantial loss should change the
court's analysis, as Speidel suggests. See Speidel, supra note 1, at 823-24.
27. Id. at 823.
28. See, e.g., id. at 825.
29. See, e.g., id. at 827-28.
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communicated to the seller or expressed in a written agreement." '30 But
such an expansion of section 2-314 seems to us at least as susceptible to
criticism for diverting Code policy as is the court's attempt to focus on
actual knowledge in the section 2-313 "basis of the bargain" context. It
is far from axiomatic that the implied warranty of merchantability was
intended to provide substantial protection to complex goods for which
the seller has little experience. 31
Another example in which the Seventh Circuit's methodology ar-
guably is not as poor as Speidel asserts is Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud
Tractor.32 In Twin Disc the court upheld a disclaimer made by the seller
which was clearly not conspicuous in spite of the dictate of section 2-
316(2) that a disclaimer in writing must be conspicuous. 33 In reaching
its decision, the court in Twin Disc noted that "[b]ecause the district
court found that [the buyer] had actual knowledge of Twin Disc's [dis-
claimer] the question of conspicuousness need not be reached." 34
Rather than ignoring the objective requirement of section 2-316(2)
as Speidel argues, the court arguably was applying an underlying Code
principle. According to Comment 1 to section 2-316, the purpose of the
conspicuousness requirement is to protect the buyer from surprise.35 The
Twin Disc court asserted that "[t]here is therefore no need to determine
whether a disclaimer is conspicuous, such that the buyer's knowledge of
disclaimer can be inferred, when the buyer has actual knowledge of the
disclaimer.",36
As Speidel notes, White and Summers argue that in ignoring the
objective requirement of 2-316, the court may run the risk of rewarding
the "convincing liar."37 We would argue, however, that the problem
largely can be avoided by requiring "clear and convincing," rather than a
mere "preponderance" of evidence regarding the buyer's actual aware-
ness. In any event, Speidel seems to be arguing for a technical applica-
tion of the Code, in contradistinction to his chiding of the Seventh
Circuit for "fail[ing] to develop a sufficiently broad conception of
merchantability" in Royal Business Machines.38 The Twin Disc court
30. Id. at 825.
31. Of course, express warranties are likewise made more difficult to establish by the Royal
Business Machines court, a fact that supports Speidel's assertion that the Seventh Circuit tends to zig
and zag as necessary to restrict warranty coverage.
32. 772 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1985).
33. Wis. STAT. § 402.316(2) (1988).
34. 772 F.2d at 1335 n.3.
35. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) Comment 1 (1989).
36. 772 F.2d at 1335 n.3.
37. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 502 (3d ed. 1988).
38. Speidel, supra note 1, at 823.
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adopted what many would argue is a common sense approach to dis-
claimers, in keeping with the Code's general mandate to adapt to com-
mercial realities.39
The above quibbles with Professor Speidel should not detract from
his considerable findings. It appears that in the Seventh Circuit sellers
prevail an inordinate amount of the time in warranty disputes involving
"big ticket" goods between large commercial entities. Certainly some of
the decisions in that circuit are open to question, as Speidel notes. For
example, the court's application of the Code's parol evidence rule in
Binks Manufacturing Co. v. National Presto Industries, Inc.,40 is at odds
with the Code and modem case law.4" Further, it is hard to defend the
court's methodology when it totally ignores relevant Code sections and
Comments, as the court did when rejecting a buyer's "equal opportu-
nity" to mitigate damages argument,42 and when it permitted evidence of
custom to negate consequential damages without looking to the limita-
tions on the use of usage of trade evidence in section 1-205.4 3
But perhaps, given the burden the Code places on the courts to ap-
ply, interpret, define, construct, and gap-fill, all according to prevailing
commercial practices and standards, an uneven judicial performance is
inevitable. However, as noted, that same broad judicial latitude does per-
mit, even unintentionally, a shifting to sellers (or buyers). If the Seventh
Circuit has perceptibly favored sellers, have other circuits followed suit,
whether independent of the Seventh or not?
III. OTHER CIRCUITS
Review of warranty disputes in the other circuits reveals a mixed
bag.44 While one circuit appears to follow the Seventh Circuit in favor-
ing the seller, the other circuits tend to find for the buyer or split between
buyer and seller. Although most circuits have decided a number of war-
39. The court was applying Wisconsin law and, while apparently finding no applicable Wiscon-
sin decisions, did cite an Illinois case and a federal decision in support of its conclusion. 772 F.2d at
1335 n.3 (citing Imperial Stamp & Engraving Co. v. Bailey, 82 Ill. App. 3d 835, 837, 403 N.E.2d
294, 296 (1980) and Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 372
(E.D. Mich. 1977)).
40. 709 F.2d 1109, 1115-17 (7th Cir. 1983).
41. Id. at 1115-17; Speidel, supra note 1, at 827-828.
42. Cates v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 780 F.2d 683, 689-90 (7th Cir. 1985); Speidel, supra
note 1, at 831-832.
43. Western Indus., Inc. v. Newcor Canada, Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984); Speidel,
supra note 1, at 46-48. See also Continental Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. K & K Sand & Gravel, Inc., 755
F.2d 87, 91-92 (7th Cir. 1985) (criticized by Speidel, supra note 1, at 829-30).
44. In our look at other circuits we surveyed cases dating back to 1980 in which a warranty
dispute governed by Article 2 was a primary issue. We did not consider cases in which warranty
claims were brought under a tort theory.
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ranty cases in the time period analyzed, two circuits have too few decided
cases to discern any meaningful trends.45 The remaining circuits will be
categorized and reviewed under the headings "Seller" Circuits, "Buyer"
Circuits, and "Mixed" Circuits.
A. "Seller" Circuits
The First Circuit is the only circuit, other than the Seventh, which
can be described as a "Seller" Circuit. Although the sample from the
First Circuit provides only three cases,46 the decisions unanimously favor
the seller. One of the cases, however, contains an exceptional fact situa-
tion which does not lend itself to a well-reasoned analysis based on Arti-
cle 2.47 The other First Circuit cases involve the issues of disclaimer of
warranties under the Massachusetts version of section 2-316,48 and notifi-
cation of breach of warranty under section 2-318.49
Transurface Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,50 involved a suit
brought by a truck buyer against a truck manufacturer, dealer, and en-
gine manufacturer, claiming breach of express and implied warranties.
The court held that the relevant warranties were those contained in the
order form and the warranty booklet5M The order form stated that all
warranties given were those of the manufacturer and that the truck
dealer made no warranties. 52 The court held such a disclaimer was effec-
tive under section 2-316; thus, summary judgment for the dealer was
proper. 53
45. A search of the Third Circuit revealed only two warranty cases: Henry Heide, Inc. v.
WRH Products Co., 766 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1985) and Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register
Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980). In the D.C. Circuit, only one case was found in which the
primary issue was a warranty dispute: Mariner Water Renaturalizer of Wash., Inc. v. Aqua Purifi-
cation Sys., Inc., 665 F.2d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
46. Castro v. Stanley Works, 864 F.2d 961 (1st Cir. 1989); Transurface Carriers, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 738 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1984); Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1980).
47. See Venezia, 626 F.2d at 188. The case involved a breach of warranty claim brought on
behalf of a child who was injured when he threw a bottle against a telephone pole and the bottle
shattered. Plaintiff alleged a breach of warranty based upon the implied warranty that goods are fit
for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. The court declined to hold that ordinary
purpose includes "the deliberate misuse of an otherwise reasonably safe container in a manner totally
unrelated to any normal or intended use of that item." Id. at 190.
48. Transurface Carriers, 738 F.2d at 46, 47 (where the court held that the truck dealer's dis-
claimer of warranties was effective because the manufacturer's warranty expressly disclaimed any
warranties given on behalf of the dealer and the language of such disclaimer was conspicuous).
49. Castro, 864 F.2d at 964 (where the court found that the manufacturer was prejudiced by
delay in notification of a breach of warranty claim, and thus, would not allow recovery under breach
of warranty).
50. 738 F.2d at 42.
51. Id. at 45.




In Castro v. Stanley Works,54 the plaintiff was injured when a spiral
ratchet screwdriver manufactured by the defendant malfunctioned. Cas-
tro brought suit claiming, among other things, breach of implied war-
ranty of merchantability. 55 The jury found for the buyer, Castro, on the
warranty claim, but also found that the defendant had been prejudiced
by delay in notification of the breach. 56 The trial judge thus found that
the delay in notification precluded Castro's warranty claim.57 The Court
of Appeals affirmed, holding that prejudice may result not only from loss
of substance but may occur when evidence that may have been revealed
from prompt investigation is lost. 58
The issues in these two cases are fairly straightforward. The sam-
pling of cases contains none of the situations referred to by Professor
Speidel which are prone to an analysis favoring the seller. Rather, these
cases involve the basic issues of whether a disclaimer was effectively
made within the standards of the statute and whether the buyer, by not
expediently notifying the seller of breach, prejudiced the seller's ability to
satisfactorily correct the breach. The disclaimer in Transurface Carriers
did not involve a "battle of the forms" under section 2-207, an area noted
by Professor Speidel in which the analysis tends to favor the seller. In
addition, the court found that the language of the disclaimer was con-
spicuous and thus met the requirements of the statute.59
Based on these two decisions, the First Circuit appears to avoid the
problems identified in Professor Speidel's review of the Seventh Circuit.




Of the twelve cases included in our survey of the Eighth Circuit,
only two were decided in favor of the seller.61 The remaining cases,
54. 864 F.2d 961 (1st Cir. 1989).
55. Id. at 963.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 964. The court, noting that formal proof of prejudice is not required, stated that "[i]t
is sufficient that the 20-month delay in notification prevented Stanley Works from investigating fully
the circumstances of the accident and ascertaining facts which later could not be determined ......
Id.
59. 738 F.2d at 46.
60. In addition, there is no evidence that the First Circuit has been influenced by the Seventh
Circuit since no Seventh Circuit opinions were cited by the First Circuit in the cases reviewed.
61. Hunter v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 798 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1986) and Golden Plump Poul-
try, Inc. v. Simmons Eng'g Co., 805 F.2d 1312 (8th Cir. 1986) were both decided in favor of the
[Vol. 65:849
COMMENT: ARTICLE TWO WARRANTY DISPUTES
favoring the buyer in their outcomes, covered a variety of issues. The
creation of an express warranty was an issue in many of the cases.62 In
analyzing this issue, the majority of the opinions relied on section 2-316.
The analysis of several of the cases is confusing, however, either because
the opinion's reliance on the U.C.C. was sparse63 or because the corre-
sponding state statute was not numbered consistently with the U.C.C.,
thus making it difficult to discern exactly what provision of the Code was
being cited.64
Warranty disclaimer was another prevalent issue in the Eighth Cir-
cuit. In each case reviewed, the Eighth Circuit declined to uphold dis-
claimers, albeit for a variety of reasons. For example, in Northern States
Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Industries,65 the court declined to uphold a dis-
claimer because of its conflict with an express warranty. 66 In Limited
Flying Club, Inc. v. Wood, 67 the court held that the disclaimer was effec-
tive only with respect to the implied warranties, but not with respect to
express warranties.68 The court in Wilson v. Marquette Electronics,
Inc.69 refused to extend the disclaimer from the parties' course of
dealing.70
Another issue present in several of the Eighth Circuit cases involved
a limitation of remedies clause in the warranty package. In those cases,
where the limited remedy under U.C.C. section 2-719 failed of its essen-
tial purpose, limitations on consequential damages were held to be void,
seller. The issues involved in these two cases included disclaimer of warranties under the Arkansas
statute that corresponds to U.C.C. § 2-316, and lack of privity, respectively.
62. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 412 (8th Cir.
1985) (where the court found that a separate express warranty was created by technical specifica-
tions proposed by the buyer); Neville Constr. Co. v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 671 F.2d 1107, 1110
(8th Cir. 1982) (where the court held that representations in a brochure can create an express war-
ranty); Select Pork, Inc. v. Babcock Swine, Inc., 640 F.2d 147, 149 (8th Cir. 1981) (where the court
held that an agreement for the sale of two specific breeds of pigs created a warranty of description);
Limited Flying Club, Inc. v. Wood, 632 F.2d 51, 56 (8th Cir. 1980) (where the court held that a
logbook given to the purchaser of an airplane providing repair and inspection history as well as
certifications of the airplane as airworthy was sufficient to create an express warranty); Wilson v.
Marquette Elec., Inc., 630 F.2d 575, 580 (8th Cir. 1980) (where the court found that oral statements
made by the seller created express warranties).
63. See Hutchinson Utilities Comm'n v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 775 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1985)
(court placed little emphasis on the U.C.C. in its analysis of the warranty issues).
64. See Matco Mach. & Tool Co. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 727 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1984).
65. 777 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1985).
66. Id. at 412.
67. 632 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1980).
68. Id. at 56-57.
69. 630 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1980).
70. Id. at 582. The court refused to hold that a standard warranty containing a disclaimer
became part of the basis of the bargain based on the parties' previous course of dealing. In the
court's words, "[t]he relatively few sales of differing equipment . . . accompanied by the standard
warranty do not in our view establish a course of dealing that would extend the disclaimer provisions
to the agreement to purchase the [equipment under consideration in this transaction]." Id. at 581.
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in spite of specific disclaimers of consequential damages within the war-
ranty.7' These decisions support Comment 1 to section 2-719 which pro-
vides that agreements limiting remedies must permit "at least minimum
adequate remedies" or a "fair quantum of remedy."' 72 Although the
Eighth Circuit did not specifically refer to the Comment when analyzing
this issue, it appears to be following the intent of the U.C.C.
Although the Eighth Circuit has sometimes strayed from "hard"
Code analysis and made statements without apparent Code authority,
overall it has taken a fairly well-reasoned approach to warranty issues,
with due regard for the statute. For example, in Northern States Power
the court, before addressing the disclaimer issue discussed above, consid-
ered whether notification of breach was sufficient. Notification is impor-
tant from the buyer's point of view because it can limit or preclude
remedy for breach.73 The Northern States Power court performed an in-
depth analysis of notification, focusing first on the language of the stat-
ute, and then looking to the relevant comment.74 It then considered the
policy underlying the provision, the precedent within the state, and deci-
sions which had addressed similar issues in other jurisdictions.75
In Select Pork, Inc. v. Babcock Swine, Inc.,76 the court analyzed
Iowa's U.C.C. in order to determine the implications of a limited remedy
which failed of its essential purpose. The seller breached an express de-
scription warranty by delivering the wrong breed of pigs. The court
ruled that a remedy limiting the buyer to return of the pigs failed of its
essential purpose because the promised pigs were "highly-touted special
pigs."'77 The court then held that the clause excluding consequential
damages was unconscionable and thus void. 78 Although the court relied
in part on the lower court's finding without questioning its analysis, the
court also looked to the language of the U.C.C. and cited a relevant com-
ment.79 Its analysis appears to parallel the methodology applied by the
Seventh Circuit, Le., which holds that, in deciding an issue of limited
remedy, every case must be analyzed on its own facts. Because the facts
71. See, e.g., R.W. Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1985);
Matco Mach. & Tool Co. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 727 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1984); Hartzell v.
Justus Co., Inc., 693 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1982); Select Pork, Inc. v. Babcock Swine, Inc., 640 F.2d 147
(8th Cir. 1981).
72. U.C.C. § 2-719 Comment 1 (1989).
73. See U.C.C. § 2-607.
74. 777 F.2d at 408.
75. Id. at 409-10.
76. 640 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1981).
77. Id. at 150.
78. Id. at 149-50.
79. Id. See U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 4.
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of this case pointed so strongly towards the buyer due to the seller's be-
havior, this case did not, in Professor Speidel's words, "leave the buyer to
fight an uphill battle."80
Finally, in Wilson v. Marquette Electronics, Inc.,8 1 the court upheld
the trial court's finding of oral express warranties. Relying on the lan-
guage of the U.C.C., the court allowed consistent and additional terms to
become part of the basis of the bargain within the parol evidence rule of
section 2-202, which created an express warranty. 82 The court applied
an even more thorough analysis in its finding of implied warranties, rely-
ing both on the language of the statute and the relevant comments.8 3
Generally, the Eighth Circuit decisions were the result of fairly con-
sistent analysis of the applicable U.C.C. provisions. As demonstrated
above, in many instances the court also looked to the comments for fur-
ther support. Thus, the argument may be made that favoring the buyer
simply means staying true to the presumptions built into Article 2 for the
protection of the buyer. Under the warranty provisions, the buyer ap-
pears to have an advantage both in proving that a warranty was created
and breached, and in seeking damages for the breach. As Professor Spei-
del notes, there is a good chance that the subjective expectations of the
buyer will be consistent with the contractual obligations of the seller,
either through express or implied warranties.8 4 Although damages may
be limited by agreement between the buyer and the seller, the Code sets
forth provisions addressing how far the seller may go in limiting dam-
ages.8 5 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit's slant toward the buyer may be the
result of that court performing its job well.
2. Ninth Circuit
The sample from the Ninth Circuit contains three warranty cases,
all favoring the buyer. In one case, Consolidated Data Terminals v. Ap-
plied Digital Data Systems, Inc.,86 the court upheld the creation of an
express warranty.87 The court also ruled that the express warranty sur-
vived even a general disclaimer, in support of the Code's explicit policy
80. Speidel, supra note 1, at 841.
81. 630 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1980).
82. Id. at 579-80.
83. Id. at 580-81 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-315 Official Comment 2 (1987)).
84. Speidel, supra note 1, at 817.
85. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-719(3), 2-316(2) (1989).
86. 708 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1983).
87. Id. at 391-92. The court held that a statement made in the written specifications for com-
puter terminals concerning the speed at which the computers would operate created an express
warranty. Id. at 391.
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prohibiting disclaimers of express warranties. 8s
These decisions also considered the implications of a limited remedy
failing of its essential purpose.8 9 Adopting reasoning similar to that of
the Eighth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit consistently held that if a limited
remedy fails of its essential purpose, the buyer may be awarded conse-
quential damages, even where the warranty contains a clause disclaiming
the payment of consequential damages. For example, the court in Fiorito
Bro&, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp.,90 applied a thorough analysis of the appli-
cable Code provisions, placing weight not only on the rules themselves
but the way in which the rules interrelated. The Fiorito court first deter-
mined that the limited remedy contained in the contract had failed of its
essential purpose.91 The court next focused on the interrelationship of
sections 2-719(2) and 2-719(3).92 The court then looked to other juris-
dictions and finally to the Official Comments to section 2-719 before de-
ciding that exclusion of consequential damages is unconscionable and
thus void where a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose.93 The
Ninth Circuit, in favoring the buyer in these cases, appears to be placing
great weight on the underlying policy of the Code, which is that although
the parties should be free to create their own agreements and remedies,
the contract may not be oppressive and must afford some "fair quantum
of remedy. '" 94  In addition to relying on the specific provisions of the
U.C.C., the Ninth Circuit also relied on the holdings of other circuits.95
The Seventh Circuit, however, was not cited.
3. Tenth Circuit
Our survey of warranty dispute cases uncovered four Tenth Circuit
cases, three of which favor the buyer. The case holding for the seller
involved the issue of whether an express warranty was created. 96 The
88. Id. See U.C.C. § 2-316(1).
89. See Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 761 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1985); Fiorito
Bros., Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); Consolidated Data Terminals v. Ap-
plied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1983).
90. Fiorito Bros., 747 F.2d at 1309.
91. Id. at 1312-13.
92. Id. at 1314. Subsection (2) states that "[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited
remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Title." WASH. REV.
CODE § 62A.2-719(2) (1989). Subsection (3) states that "[c]onsequential damages may be limited or
excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable." Id. at § 62A.2-719(3).
93. 747 F.2d at 1314-15.
94. U.C.C. § 2-719 Comment I.
95. To cite several examples, the court in Consolidated Data Terminals, 708 F.2d at 397, re-
ferred to the Sixth Circuit. Similarly, the court in Fiorito Bros., 747 F.2d at 1313, 1315, cited the
Eighth Circuit, and the court in Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am. 761 F.2d 553, 556
(9th Cir. 1985) cited the Sixth Circuit.
96. Universal Drilling Co. v. Camay Drilling Co., 737 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1984).
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court held that a description of drilling rigs contained in a contract did
not create an express warranty that the rigs would conform to that de-
scription. 97 The court, in reaching its decision, undertook a thorough
analysis of Colorado's U.C.C., relying on the language of the relevant
provisions and the Comments.9" Thus, although the court found for the
seller, it did so while focusing on the statute.
In Ponderosa System, Inc. v. Brandt, 99 the court found for the buyer
on a breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. Although refer-
ring to provisions within the Wyoming statute, the court in Ponderosa
did not rely on the statute to the same extent it did in the other Tenth
Circuit cases. In addition, the court's quoted language from the Wyo-
ming statute is somewhat confusing because the numbering of the Wyo-
ming statute does not correspond to the numbering of the U.C.C.
The decisions in the remaining two cases demonstrate well-rea-
soned analysis of warranty issues. One case involved the creation of an
express warranty °° while the other involved the creation of an implied
warranty.10 Both decisions relied on the applicable statutory language.
One of the decisions, Downie v. Abex Corp., also relied on the Comments
to the U.C.C. in determining that the seller's affirmations of fact had
become part of the basis of the bargain, thus creating an express
warranty. 102
Overall, from the small sample of Tenth Circuit cases reviewed, the
court appears to more thoroughly rely upon Article 2 language than does
the Seventh Circuit. In addition, in Downie the court avoided the more
complex test applied by the Seventh Circuit in express warranty cases
which required a showing of reliance. The Tenth Circuit relied on the
language of Official Comment 3 to U.C.C. section 2-313 which states, "in
actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller ... are regarded as
part of the description of those goods; hence no particular reliance on
such statements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of
the agreement . ,, o3 The court then hedged, however, stating that the
issue need not be decided because there was sufficient evidence for a ra-
tional jury to find that the buyer did rely on the seller's express
97. Id. at 874.
98. See id. at 873-74.
99. 767 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1985).
100. Downie v. Abex Corp., 741 F.2d 1235 (10th Cir. 1984).
101. Patty Precision Products Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg., Co., 846 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1988).
102. 741 F.2d at 1240. The court relied on the language of Official Comment 7 to § 2-313 which
stated in part that "lt]he sole question is whether the language ... [is] fairly to be regarded as part of
the contract." U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 7.




The Tenth Circuit relied almost solely on its own understanding of
the U.C.C. and corresponding Comments when resolving warranty dis-
putes, citing only one other circuit. Because the Tenth Circuit sample is
small, it is difficult to discern an overall trend. With the possible excep-
tion of Ponderosa, the Tenth Circuit appears to have performed well in
its application of Article 2.
C. "Mixed" Circuits
1. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit has decided only three warranty dispute cases
since 1980 but the cases are noteworthy because of their reference to
other circuits. Although the results in these decisions do not favor buy-
ers or sellers, the court relies on decisions from the Third, Sixth, Eighth
and Ninth Circuits. More importantly, for our purposes, two cases cite
Seventh Circuit opinions: Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co. v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp.'05 and Sobiech v. International Staple & Machine
Co. 10 6
In Tokio Marine, the court's reference to the Seventh Circuit favors
the buyer, stating that a seller's liability may be altered as long as the
buyer is left with a "fair quantum of remedy."' 10 7 In Sobiech, the court
cites the Seventh Circuit for the proposition that "a purchaser cannot
recover damages for breach of implied or express warranties that an ex-
amination of the goods should have revealed to him."' 1 8 Although the
court in these cases relied in part on the Seventh Circuit for its holding,
the Seventh Circuit's influence in these particular situations is not con-
troversial and does not evidence seller bias.
2. Fourth Circuit
The sample from the Fourth Circuit contains eleven cases, with the
decisions appearing to favor the buyer only slightly more than the
seller. 109 The court does appear to favor the buyer with respect to some
104. Id.
105. 617 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980).
106. 867 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1989).
107. 617 F.2d at 940-41. The court was citing AES Technology Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radia-
tion, 583 F.2d 933, 939 (7th Cir. 1978), in which the Seventh Circuit quoted language from U.C.C.
§ 2-719 Comment 1. Id.
108. 867 F.2d at 783 (citing Royal Bus. Mach., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 44 (7th Cir.
1980)).
109. The decisions holding for the buyer include: Fullerton Aircraft Sales & Rentals, Inc. v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 842 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1988); Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Webber, 841
[Vol. 65:849
COMMENT. ARTICLE TWO WARRANTY DISPUTES
issues. For example, the Fourth Circuit does not require privity of con-
tract in order for the buyer to bring a breach of warranty claim.110 In
addition, the decisions generally uphold breach of express and implied
warranties unless there is a disclaimer which limits warranties,11 or un-
less the buyer has reason to know that he could not rely on the war-
ranty.1 1 2 The court also requires, where a limited remedy fails of its
essential purpose, that the buyer be given some remedy for a breach of
warranty. Thus, in Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.," 3 the buyer was
allowed to recover consequential damages even though the warranty con-
tained an express exclusion of consequentials." 4
In the majority of the Fourth Circuit cases reviewed, the court re-
ferred to the relevant provisions of the U.C.C. and often referred to other
circuit court cases, including the Seventh Circuit. References to the Sev-
enth Circuit include holdings favoring both the buyer and the seller. For
example, in Coastal Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc.,' 5 the court, cit-
ing the Seventh Circuit's decision V-M Corp. v. Bernard Distributing
Co.,1 6 focused on the parties' expectations and held that each "intended
to receive something from their bargain."' 1 7 Because the parties had not
expressly agreed to limit consequential damages, the court allowed the
buyer to recover them." 8 In contrast, the court in Kaplan v. RCA
Corp.,' 9 relied on a Seventh Circuit case as support for upholding the
seller's exclusion of consequential damages.' 20  Citing AES Technology
F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1988); Spartanburg County School Dist. Seven v. National Gypsum Co., 805
F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1986); Roy Stone Transfer Corp. v. Budd Co., 796 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1986);
Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587 (4th Cit. 1985); Klein v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 773
F.2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1985); Coastal Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc., 635 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir.
1980). The following Fourth Circuit cases favored the seller: Kaplan v. RCA Corp., 783 F.2d 463
(4th Cir. 1986); Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 778 F.2d 196 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1985); Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 696 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1982); Fisch-
bach & Moore Int'l Corp. v. Crane Barge R-14, 632 F.2d 1123 (4th Cir. 1980).
110. See Fullerton Aircraft Sales & Rentals, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 842 F.2d 717 (4th Cir.
1988).
111. See, e.g., Spartanburg, 805 F.2d at 1150 (where court held that state of the art defense is not
allowed to excuse breach of an implied warranty); Klein, 773 F.2d at 1424-25 (where court found
breach of express and implied warranties). But see Hill, 696 F.2d at 292 (where court held that
buyer was limited to warranties set out in the disclaimer).
112. See, e.g., Fishbach, 632 F.2d at 1125 (where the court held that buyer could not recover in
warranty if he knew or had reason to know of nonconformity of goods).
113. 775 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1985).
114. Id. at 593.
115. 635 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1980).
116. 447 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1971).
117. 635 F.2d at 1107.
118. Id.
119. 783 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1986).
120. Id. at 467.
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Systems, Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 21 the court held that the failure of a
repair and replacement warranty does not necessarily void the seller's
exclusion of consequential damages.122
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit's influence on the Fourth Circuit is
only slight. The Fourth Circuit appears to have heavily relied on the
U.C.C. to afford the buyer some measure of remedy. Additionally, the
buyer is advantaged by the court's refusal to require privity of contract
between the buyer and seller for breach of warranty action. Thus, in the
Fourth Circuit, the buyer appears to have an easier battle in breach of
warranty cases than Professor Speidel argues is the case in the Seventh
Circuit.
3. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit were analyzed together
due to the fact that the Eleventh Circuit was created out of the Fifth
Circuit in 1981. Of the fourteen warranty dispute cases decided, only
three were Eleventh Circuit cases. 123
The sampling of cases decided in the Fifth Circuit demonstrated
mixed results. Seven of the cases were resolved in favor of the seller and
three favored the buyer. Of the remaining decisions, two decisions were
split between seller and buyer, and two cases were remanded for further
consideration of various issues.
Several of the decisions favoring the seller addressed the validity of
disclaimer of warranties and held that the disclaimers were effective as
long as they were not unconscionable. 24 The Fifth Circuit in Arkwright-
Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.,' 25 also upheld the seller's limitation of remedies as not
121. 583 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1978).
122. 783 F.2d at 467.
123. Earman Oil Co., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980) was decided in
1980 and was thus part of the "old" Fifth Circuit. However, the action was originally brought in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida which is now part of the Eleventh
Circuit. Bowdoin v. Showell Growers, Inc., 817 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1987) and Royal Typewriter
Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092 (11 th Cir. 1983) were decided after the creation of
the Eleventh Circuit.
124. See Arkwright-Boston Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 844 F.2d 1174,
1183-84 (5th Cir. 1988) (court found that disclaimers of implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability for a particular purpose were conspicuous and in compliance with Texas law);
Earman, 625 F.2d at 1299 (court held that disclaimers of warranty were not unconscionable); Two
Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d 1242, 1252 (5th Cir. 1980) (court held that disclaimer
of warranty of merchantability was effective against buyer), cert denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981); FMC
Finance Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 1980) (court held that disclaimer language
was conspicuous and not unconscionable).
125. 844 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1988).
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unconscionable. 126
A more difficult issue addressed by the Fifth Circuit involves deter-
mining when a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose. The Fifth
Circuit never clearly defined the standards used to resolve this issue.
Even where the court found that the limited remedy had failed of its
essential purpose, however, the court upheld the seller's exclusion of con-
sequential damages. For example, in Reynolds Metals Co. v. Westing-
house Electric Co., 127 even though the seller's disclaimer of warranty was
held inapplicable because there was a total failure of performance, the
case was remanded on the issue of damages because the lower court had
incorrectly awarded consequential damages where the seller had ex-
pressly excluded such damages. 128
The court favored the buyer in two cases on the issue of breach of
express warranty. 129 In one of those cases, Lindemann v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
the court relied on section 2-313 of the Code in deciding that the buyer
had adequately proven the elements necessary to find breach. Based on
the U.C.C. and earlier decisions, the court held that in order to bring a
successful cause of action for breach of express warranty, the plaintiff
does not have to prove a product defect but need only show that the
product failed to comply with the terms of the warranty.1 30
In another case favoring the buyer, Clark v. DeLaval Separator
Corp.,131 the court refused to extend a disclaimer of warranty to the man-
ufacturer when the disclaimer was not expressly made by the manufac-
turer but by the retailer. 132 Thus, the manufacturer in this case was
subject to an action for breach of implied warranty of merchantability. 133
In addition, the court looked to other jurisdictions, including the Seventh
Circuit. One Seventh Circuit case cited contained a fact pattern that was
very similar to the facts before the Eleventh Circuit (included as part of
126. Id. at 1182. See also Lindemann v. Eli Lilly & Co., 816 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1987)
(manufacturer's exclusion of consequential damages was not unconscionable); Reynolds Metals Co.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 758 F.2d 1073, 1080 (5th Cir. 1985) (where exclusion of consequential
damages clause was upheld).
127. 758 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1985).
128. Id. at 1079.
129. Lindemann, 816 F.2d at 202 (where the court found that evidence of excessive weeds in
fields where warranted herbicide had been properly applied was sufficient to find breach of express
warranty); Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1101 (11th Cir.
1983) (where the court held that affirmations made by the seller to the buyer concerning the useful
life of a copier and the cost of maintenance gave rise to an express warranty).
130. 816 F.2d at 202.
131. 639 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1981).
132. Id. at 1323.
133. Id. at 1324.
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the Fifth Circuit).134 The other Seventh Circuit case referenced was
cited for its rejection of a claim that a remedy had failed of its essential
purpose. In finding for the seller, the court in Arkwright-Boston Manu-
facturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Westinghouse Electric 135 relied on the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning that where two sophisticated purchasers ne-
gotiate a limited remedy, the purchaser cannot claim that the warranty
failed of its essential purpose merely because a claim did not arise until
after the warranty had expired.' 36
Based on these examples, it appears that the Seventh Circuit may
have had some influence on the Fifth Circuit's analysis of warranty dis-
putes. The Fifth Circuit, however, also places great weight on the princi-
ples of the controlling state law, which may explain some differing
outcomes. Although the Fifth Circuit decisions frequently favored the
seller, the analyses were based on a thorough review of the applicable
U.C.C. provisions. In general, the court, consistent with the policies of
the U.C.C., allowed the parties' bargains to stand as long as they were
not unconscionable and as long as the buyer was afforded some relief. 37
4. Sixth Circuit
The majority of the nine cases in the Sixth Circuit favored the seller
although there were several decisions which found for the buyer. The
cases favoring the seller primarily considered whether there was an ex-
press or implied warranty and whether it was breached. Several of the
cases found that the seller had not made any warranties. 38 In one case,
Dugan & Meyers Construction Co., Inc. v. Worthington Pump Corp.,139
the court found that the limited warranty terms were part of the con-
tract and alternatively held that the seller had not breached an implied
warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. 14° In
134. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092 (1lth Cir. 1983). In
Royal Typewriter the court cited Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 46
(7th Cir. 1980) as support for its finding that the buyer had not sufficiently demonstrated that the
copy machines that the buyer had purchased from the seller failed to conform to existing standards
of the trade at the time of sale. 719 F.2d at 1092, 1099.
135. 844 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 830 F.2d 1405, 1412-13 (7th Cir. 1987)).
136. Id. at 1179.
137. See, e.g., 844 F.2d at 1174; FMC Finance Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1980).
But see Lafayette Stabilizer Repair, Inc. v. Machinery Wholesalers Corp., 750 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir.
1985).
138. See Lancaster Glass Corp. v. Philips ECG, Inc., 835 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1987); Beyette v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 823 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1987); Price Bros. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear
Corp., 649 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1981).
139. 746 F.2d 1166 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1984).
140. Id. at 1168.
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Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories, Inc., 4 1 the court found no implied
warranty of merchantability but remanded the case on the issue of ex-
press warranty.
The cases in which the buyer prevailed concerned the issue of the
appropriate remedy in warranty cases. In Martin v. Joseph Harris Co.,
Inc.,142 the court held that the seller's disclaimer and limitation of rem-
edy clause was unconscionable because of the unequal bargaining power
between the buyer and the seller. 143 The court further upheld the finding
below that seller had breached the implied warranty of
merchantability. 1" In another case, the court reversed on the issue of
damages, instructing the lower court to award consequential damages to
the buyer for the seller's breach of warranties. 145 Finally, in Lewis Re-
frigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co.,146 the
court found for the buyer in part, holding that the limited remedy had
failed of its essential purpose and that consequential damages are author-
ized in appropriate cases. 147 The court also held that an exclusion of
consequential damages can stand even if a limited remedy fails of its es-
sential purpose, unless it is unconscionable. 148 The court remanded on
the issue of unconscionability. 149
Most of the Sixth Circuit's warranty dispute cases demonstrate at-
tention to the applicable Code language. All of the cases except one re-
ferred to the relevant state's version of the U.C.C. and several of the
cases referred to the Official Comments. The Sixth Circuit commonly
cited other circuits as support for its decisions.
One reference to the Seventh Circuit is of particular interest. In
Overstreet v. Norden, the court relied on the Seventh Circuit on the ques-
tion of whether mere reliance was sufficient to prove breach of an express
warranty.150 The Sixth Circuit first held that, under the Kentucky ver-
sion of the U.C.C. in order to show that a warranty is part of the basis of
the bargain, the buyer must have relied upon the warranty as "one of the
inducements for purchasing the product." 151 The court's analysis of this
141. 669 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1982).
142. 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1985).
143. Id. at 299-302.
144. 767 F.2d at 296-97.
145. Taylor & Gaskin, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus., 732 F.2d 1273, 1279 (6th Cir. 1984).
146. 709 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1983).
147. Id. at 432.
148. Id. at 434-35.
149. Id. at 436.
150. 669 F.2d at 1290, 1292 (citing Royal Business Machines v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34
(7th Cir. 1980)).
151. 669 F.2d at 1291.
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issue closely follows the Seventh Circuit reasoning criticized by Professor
Speidel for requiring proof of actual reliance for breach of an express
warranty. The Overstreet court noted that although a buyer has no obli-
gation to investigate a seller's representations before relying on them, "a
buyer may not rely blindly on a statement or affirmation that he knows is
incorrect."1 52 It reversed the lower court's judgment for the buyer, rul-
ing that the instructions on express warranty were erroneous for failure
to include the requirement that the buyer must have relied on the war-
ranty in order to bring an action. 15 3
V. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit in Overstreet v. Norden, illustrates the influence
that the Seventh Circuit may have as the circuits contend with difficult
Code problems, such as the "basis of the bargain" test. But, overall, the
Seventh Circuit's influence on other circuits in the warranty area appears
slight, with a couple of notable exceptions. Moreover, the Seventh Cir-
cuit's pattern of favoring the seller, as demonstrated by Speidel, does not
appear to be duplicated elsewhere. We have found, in general, that the
other circuits do an adequate job of analyzing warranty issues and do not
stray from pure Code methodology as frequently as does the Seventh.
However, Speidel may be more critical on this score than we.
While we believe that Professor Speidel may be somewhat overzeal-
ous in his criticism of the Seventh Circuit's methodology, he firmly estab-
lishes that buyers have not fared well there, in contradistinction to our
findings elsewhere. One could make the argument that the flexibility in-
herent in Article 2 permits a court to become a policymaker in attempt-
ing to conform the law to commercial practice. However, it would be
going too far to assert that Article 2 gives a court carte blanche to ignore
its structure or to redefine its presumptions.
Certainly Article 2 presents a myriad of difficulties for the judiciary
faced with its application. Some biases should be expected, given Article
2's interpretation burden and its concomitant adaptability. But Speidel
argues that the Seventh Circuit has gone too far, and with the evidence
he has compiled, it is hard to disagree.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1295.
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